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Abstract
A growing number of studies on the higher-order cognitive functions of the human brain use brain-imaging techniques, such as functional
magnetic resonance imaging (fMRI). For the validity and generality of fMRI results, it is important that the relevant cognitive processes
are equivalent to those functioning in typical settings used in behavioral research. This equivalence could be, for example, endangered by
different spatial frames of reference when lying in the scanner. In the present study, we tested whether the cognitive processes, as reflected
in behavioral data in brain-imaging settings, are indeed functionally equivalent to those reflected in “purely” behavioral settings. To this end,
we used a task-switching paradigm with a spatial component, increasing the likelihood to find effects of experimental setting. We compared
the data of three different groups that only differed in testing environments (real, operating fMRI vs simulated fMRI vs standard behavioral
with upright position of participants) but used otherwise strictly equivalent experimental conditions. Of importance for our validation
purposes, unlike previous studies, we included a group with a behavioral setting, and we tested whether we would replicate a nontrivial,
complex three-way interaction across all three groups. We replicated the predicted complex data pattern in all groups, suggesting functional
equivalence of the underlying cognitive processes. We also found strongly increased reaction time (RT) levels in the two fMRI groups. We
attribute this increase to unspecific distracting factors affecting late motor processes and discuss potential methodological implications of
this increased baseline RT in the scanner.
© 2003 Elsevier Science (USA). All rights reserved.
A growing number of studies on the cognitive functions
of the human brain use brain-imaging techniques. Two
major imaging techniques are position emission tomogra-
phy (PET) and functional magnetic resonance imaging
(fMRI). Most notably during the past years, the enhanced
spatial and temporal resolution of fMRI has led to an in-
creasingly better understanding of the neural basis of cog-
nitive higher-order functions (see, e.g., D’Esposito et al.,
1999).
A major merit of using brain-imaging techniques is that
imaging data provide a potentially very important measure
correlated with cognitive functions in addition to the more
traditional measures of cognitive psychology, such as reac-
tion time (RT) and error rate. Integrating conclusions from
these complementary measures may thus have the power to
give a strong synergy effect in cognitive neuroscience.
It is clear though that the validity of the conclusions
derived from brain-imaging studies critically rests on the
assumption that the use of brain-imaging techniques does
not alter the cognitive functions the experimenter sets out to
explore. In the present study, we aimed at testing whether
the cognitive processes in imaging experiments are indeed
functionally equivalent to those in behavioral experiments.
There are at least two reasons why cognitive processes
might be altered in the fMRI scanner relative to standard
experimental settings. First, it might be that adaptations of
the experimental design in order to comply with the needs
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of newly developed techniques, such as event-related fMRI,
affect the very nature of the cognitive functions one is
interested in. For instance, using very long intertrial inter-
vals deviates from the typically much shorter intervals in
cognitive psychology studies.
Second, it might be that the very unfamiliar and uncom-
fortable environment inside the fMRI scanner has relevant
effects on cognitive processes. For instance, inside the scan-
ner, the participant is in a supine position, it is quite noisy,
and task stimuli are presented by means of special lenses or
a mirror. In contrast, conditions of typical behavioral ex-
periments are that participants sit in an upright position in
front of the screen in a noise-free lab. Consequently, the
spatial frame of reference of participants may be very dif-
ferent between these settings. This aspect was especially
emphasized in the present study, in which participants were
required to judge the vertical position of a target stimulus
within a 2  2 grid. When sitting, this judgment was
between UP and DOWN; however, when lying down, this
judgment was, properly speaking, between “in front” and
“behind”. Hence, in particular for tasks in which spatial
information is relevant, it might be that these differences in
the experimental settings also change some aspects of cog-
nitive processing.
The goal of the present study was to test whether cog-
nitive processes are indeed functionally equivalent in brain-
imaging settings and in behavioral settings. We tested this
important methodological question by using a task-switch-
ing paradigm. The task-switching paradigm has been used
in a number of recent imaging studies exploring cognitive
control processes (e.g., Brass and von Cramon, 2002; Dove
et al., 2000; Kimberg et al., 2000; Sohn et al., 2000). In the
task-switching paradigm, performance typically declines in
a task switch as compared to a task repetition. These “shift
costs” may be related to cognitive control processes making
sure that the correct task is performed (e.g., Allport et al.,
1994; Meiran, 1996; Rogers and Monsell, 1995). Given the
current prominence of research on cognitive control in cog-
nitive neuroscience (see Miller and Cohen, 2001), it is of
particular importance to test the functional equivalence of
cognitive control processes inside and outside the scanner.
In order to investigate this functional equivalence in task
switching, we tested three groups of participants. The tasks
and experimental design were identical in all groups. In a
first group, we tested participants in a lying position on a
stretcher (“simulated MRI” group, for details see Methods).
The second group was tested under real fMRI conditions
inside the operating scanner (“real MRI”). Of importance,
we also tested a third group with the standard conditions of
a behavioral experiment (“standard behavioral”).
In all three groups, we used a pair of spatial judgment
tasks introduced by Meiran (1996). A spatial target stimulus
is presented in one of four quadrants on the screen. The task
is either to judge the vertical stimulus position (i.e., whether
it is “up” or “down”, ignoring the horizontal stimulus di-
mension) or to judge the horizontal position (left vs right,
ignoring the vertical dimension). Participants indicate their
judgment by pressing either a lower left key (for down or
left) or an upper right key (for up or right). Note that these
tasks involve strong spatial components, thus increasing the
likelihood of finding differences across settings.
Because the S–R mappings of both tasks are completely
overlapping, an external task cue indicated the current task
in an otherwise random task sequence. In this paradigm,
task preparation processes can be explored by varying the
cue-target interval. The typical result is that performance
improves with longer cuing intervals. Of importance, shift
costs are also reduced, indicating a process of advance
reconfiguration of task set (e.g., Meiran, 1996; Rogers and
Monsell, 1995). According to Meiran’s (2000) model, one
aspect of task-set reconfiguration consists of changing at-
tentional weights of the currently relevant and irrelevant
stimulus dimensions. This stimulus-set reconfiguration
should not be necessary when the stimuli are univalent (i.e.,
contain only one dimension), so both shift costs and cuing
effects should be reduced as compared with bivalent stimuli.
Note that we derived from this model a complex, nontrivial
three-way interaction. We tested whether we would repli-
cate this complex interaction across experimental settings,
thus providing a powerful test of the functional equivalence
of cognitive control processes inside and outside the scan-
ner.
In summary, in order to test the functional equivalence of
cognitive processes in brain-imaging studies and behavioral
studies, we (1) used a paradigm with a strong spatial com-
ponent, thus rendering effects of experimental setting likely;
(2) tested the replicability of a complex, theoretically de-
rived three-way interaction; and (3) compared this interac-




We tested three groups of participants. Thirty-six partic-
ipants were tested at the Max Planck Institute for Psycho-
logical Research in Munich and were randomly assigned to
either the standard behavioral group (10 female, 8 male, age
19–29) or the simulated MRI group (13 female, 5 male, age
18–28). The real MRI group of 16 participants (8 female, 8
male, age 22–32) was tested inside the operating scanner at
the Max Planck Institute of Cognitive Neuroscience in
Leipzig.
Task, apparatus, and procedure
Participants performed two spatial judgment tasks. In
one task, they were required to decide whether a square
(1.0-cm side length), presented in a two by two grid (6.0-cm
side length), was in the upper or lower half of the grid, and
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in the other task, they decided whether the square was on the
left or right side of the grid. The task in a given trial was
indicated by two arrows (0.6 cm wide) presented either
above or below the grid, or on the left or right side of the
grid, indicating the up–down task or the left–right task,
respectively. In both tasks, participants responded with their
index fingers of the left and right hand. Half of the partic-
ipants used either a lower left key and an upper right key on
an external keyboard, whereas the other half of the partic-
ipants used an upper left key and a lower right key.
Participants were instructed about the tasks and that they
would perform these tasks in two different stimulus-valence
conditions. They received demonstration trials in order to
become familiar with the experimental conditions. In the
bivalent stimulus block, the stimuli were presented in one
out of four spatial positions on the screen. In the univalent
block, the stimuli were presented either in the upper or
lower part of the screen, superimposed on the vertical di-
viding line, or in the left or right part of the screen, super-
imposed on the horizontal dividing line. The experiment
consisted of two experimental blocks of 128 trials each. In
each block, 16 empty trials were randomly inserted. The
order of blocks was counterbalanced across participants.
Before each of the experimental blocks, a short practice
phase of 60 trials was carried out in order to familiarize
participants with the stimulus layout.
A trial started with the presentation of the grid for 300
ms. The task cues were then presented, and after a randomly
chosen period of 100- or 2000-ms cue-target interval, the
target appeared. Participants responded by pressing one out
of two response keys. After that, an empty response-grid
interval was presented for a variable duration, so that the
intertrial interval was 6000 ms. We introduced a jitter in the
onsets of events for the purpose of the real event-related
fMRI measurement, but that was identical for the groups.
Exactly the same experimental software and experimental
definitions were used for all three groups, except for the
differences described below.
In the standard behavioral group, participants sat in a
silent room in an upright position in front of a VGA monitor
connected to an IBM compatible PC. In the simulated MRI
group, participants lay down on a stretcher. They viewed the
stimulus display positioned behind their head via an indi-
vidually adjustable mirror. They heard typical MRI noise
via a headphone. Participants were told to adjust the volume
so that it was uncomfortable but still bearable. While these
two groups were tested at the Max Planck Institute for
Psychological Research in Munich, the third, real fMRI
group was tested inside an operating scanner at the Max
Planck Institute of Cognitive Neuroscience in Leipzig.
(Technical details as regards the MRI machine are described
in Brass and von Cramon, 2002.)
Design
The independent variables of the experiment were trial
type (task shift vs repeat), cue-target interval (100 vs 2000
ms), and stimulus valence (bivalent vs univalent). Trial type
and cue-target interval were varied randomly within a block,
whereas stimulus valence was varied between blocks of
trials. Group was a between-subject variable (standard be-
havioral, stimulated MRI, and real MRI). Dependent vari-
ables were RT and error rates. All statistical analyses were
run with an alpha level of 0.05.
Results and discussion
We do not report the brain-imaging data in this paper, but
focus on the behavioral data. The two practice phases pre-
ceding each experimental block were not analyzed. For the
analysis of the experimental blocks, we first discarded ex-
tremely slow responses (RT  1500 ms; 0.5% of all re-
sponses). For RT analysis, we also discarded trials with
incorrect responses (for error rates, see below). We then
determined the mean RT for each participant as a function
of trial type, cuing interval, and stimulus valence. Finally,
we averaged the individual cell means for each group of
participants (see Table 1).
We submitted the RT data to a four-way analysis of
Table 1
Mean RT as a function of stimulus valence, trial type, cuing interval, and group
Group Univalent stimuli Bivalent stimuli
Trial type Trial type
Shift Repeat Shift cost Shift Repeat Shift cost
Standard behavioral
Cuing interval  100 ms 415 388 27 566 499 67
Cuing interval  2000 ms 409 399 10 482 461 21
Simulated MRI
Cuing interval  100 ms 474 446 28 647 553 94
Cuing interval  2000 ms 463 455 8 540 524 16
Real MRI
Cuing interval  100 ms 558 536 22 720 643 77
Cuing interval  2000 ms 535 525 10 592 578 14
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variance (ANOVA) with the independent variables trial
type, cuing interval, stimulus valence, and group. This
yielded significant main effects of trial type, F(1, 49) 
140.741, P 0.001; cuing interval, F(1, 49)  35.342, P 
0.001; and stimulus valence, F(1, 49)  121.843, P 
0.001. Stimulus valence interacted significantly with trial
type, F(1, 49) 39.793, P 0.001, and with cuing interval,
F(1, 49) 42.836, P 0.001. With univalent stimuli, there
were shift costs of 18 ms, but shift costs were 48 ms with
bivalent stimuli. The cuing interval effect was only 6 ms
with univalent stimuli, but it was 76 ms with bivalent
stimuli. The cuing interval also affected shift costs, F(1, 49)
 43.598, P  0.001, indicating that shift costs were 52 ms
with the short cuing interval but only 13 ms with the long
cuing interval. Finally, there was a significant three-way
interaction of trial type, stimulus valence, and cuing inter-
val, F(1, 49)  23.635, P  0.001, indicating that long
preparation time reduced shift costs in the univalent condi-
tion by 16 ms (i.e., from 25 to 9 ms), but that the shift-cost
reduction was much stronger in the bivalent condition (62
ms; i.e., from 79 to 17 ms).
Together, these effects conform very well to the predic-
tions that we derived from the task-switching model pro-
posed by Meiran (2000). Providing long preparation time
serves to reduce shift costs, suggesting advance reconfigu-
ration of task set. The stimulus-related aspect of this recon-
figuration process was expected to be weaker with univalent
stimuli, because such stimuli do not require reconfiguration
of stimulus set. In line with this prediction, we found that
both shift costs and preparation effects were very small in
the univalent condition as compared with the bivalent con-
dition. In sum, across all three groups of participants, we
obtained the pattern of results that we predicted based on
our theoretical assumptions.
The crucial question of the present study was whether
this complex and nontrivial data pattern would be the same
across all groups or whether it would differ as a function of
testing environment. In order to answer this question, the
effects of the between-subject variable group are relevant.
In fact, we got a significant main effect of group, F(1, 49)
 8.707, P  0.001. Mean RT level was 452 ms (SE  22
ms) in the standard behavioral group, 513 ms (SE  22 ms)
in the simulated MRI group, and 586 ms (SE  23 ms) in
the real MRI group. Pairwise comparisons indicated signif-
icant differences between each pair of groups (all Ps 
0.05), statistically confirming that participants in the behav-
ioral group were fastest, those in the real MRI group slow-
est, and those in the simulated MRI group in between.
Importantly, apart from this main effect of group, there were
no significant interactions of the group variable with any
one, or any combination, of the other three variables (all Ps
 0.23), indicating that the effects of preparation, trial type,
and valence as well as their interactions were statistically
identical in the three groups.
The pattern of statistical effects in the error rates closely
mirrors that found for the RT, so we do not report these data
in detail. We observed the same statistical effects in the
ANOVA, except that the three-way interaction of trial type,
cuing interval, and stimulus valence failed to reach signif-
icance, F(1, 49)  3.191, P  0.080. Also the main effect
of group, F  1, and all interactions with group were
insignificant, all Ps .14. Hence, the general RT slowing in
the simulated MRI group and even more so in the real MRI
group as compared to that in the standard behavioral group
is not counteracted by more accurate responses, thus ruling
out a simple speed-accuracy trade-off account for the
present RT data pattern.
In order to evaluate the validity of the significant main
effect of group in the RT data, we note that the participants
in the real MRI group came from a different pool of par-
ticipants than those in the other two groups. Also, they were
tested in Leipzig, whereas the other two groups were tested
in Munich. Therefore, one might argue that preexperimental
group differences might partially explain the main effect of
group. However, the RT data show that also the two groups
tested in Munich differ significantly in RT level, which is to
be explained by the experimental variation. Therefore, we
think it is very likely that also the slowing in the real MRI
group is due to the experimental conditions. In fact, given
that potential distracting effects of MRI conditions should
be stronger in the real MRI than in a simulation, then this
pattern of results is exactly what one would have expected.
To summarize, we found a significant influence of the
experimental setting on general RT level, but this influence
was nonspecific and did not interact with any other variable.
Based on this finding, we conclude that our data support the
idea that cognitive control processes in task switching are
functionally equivalent inside and outside the scanner. Note
that, strictly speaking, this empirical conclusion is limited to
the domain of task switching. However, it is clearly impor-
tant to know whether this functional equivalence applies to
other research domains as well. This raises the issue of
which processes are actually affected inside the scanner that
produce the general slowing that we observed in our study.
To explain this general slowing, we believe that unspe-
cific distracting factors inside the scanner, such as the su-
pine position and the noise, delay some aspect of perfor-
mance. In order to specify this aspect, we can first conclude
on the basis of our data that cognitive control processes (i.e.,
reconfiguration) are not affected because shift costs, as
empirical marker for these processes, were virtually the
same across all testing conditions. Hence, the unspecific
distraction appears to prolong perceptual or motor compo-
nents. We believe that it is highly unlikely that early visual
processes (e.g., feature extraction) are affected, but more
perceptual–cognitive aspects (e.g., stimulus identification)
might be a possible candidate because, in the present ex-
periment, the “up–down” task might be recoded as “in
front–behind” when being in a supine position. However,
this would be true only for the vertical dimension, whereas
processing of the horizontal dimension (the left–right task)
should be unchanged. We tested this possibility by running
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an ANOVA that additionally included the independent vari-
able task (up–down vs left–right). We found that the left–
right task was performed on average 26 ms faster than the
up–down task (P 0.001), but that no interaction involving
the task variable and the between-subject variable (i.e.,
testing condition) was significant. Therefore, we believe
that this perceptual–cognitive aspect is unlikely to account
for the general slowing.
Other possible cognitive aspects of information process-
ing to account for the slowing inside the scanner might be
categorization and response selection. Our valence manip-
ulation appears to tap these processing aspects, because in
the bivalent condition, stimulus selection, stimulus–re-
sponse transformation, and response selection have to pro-
ceed in the face of a distractor (such as in the Stroop
color-word task, see MacLeod, 1991, for review). Similar
processes may underlie stimulus–response compatibility ef-
fects (for review, see Kornblum et al., 1990; Lien and
Proctor, 2002). However, our data clearly indicate that this
aspect is the same across testing conditions (i.e., no inter-
action including the valence variable and the experimental
group variable was significant), so it cannot account for the
slowing.
Hence, based on this analysis we can tentatively rule out
the notion that perceptual and cognitive processes (e.g.,
reconfiguration, stimulus identification, response selection)
are subject to the general response delay inside the scanner.
This renders “late” processes of motor initiation and exe-
cution the most likely candidate to account for this slowing.
One speculative account of this “motor” slowing might be
that participants do not see their hands inside the scanner,
which might increase response monitoring. However, alter-
natively it might be that still unknown physiological factors
might play a role. Given the practical relevance of knowing
the exact causes of the observed response slowing inside the
scanner, we believe that it would be desirable to explore
these causes also in experimental paradigms different from
the one used here. Hence, we would like to encourage other
cognitive neuroscience researchers to conduct similar stud-
ies with their experimental paradigm.
With respect to our conclusion of functional equivalence
of cognitive processes inside and outside the scanner, note
that we explicitly tested only the effects of rather unspecific
factors associated with the testing environment in brain-
imaging studies. There might be other factors affecting the
functional equivalence of cognitive processes across studies
that are related more specifically to aspects of the experi-
mental design. For instance, in order to run an event-related
fMRI study, one normally introduces jitter in the onset of
events, which is typically avoided in behavioral studies.
Perhaps even more important, event-related fMRI studies
typically use intertrial intervals longer than those in behav-
ioral studies. This might be an important difference across
brain-imaging and behavioral studies in the context of task
switching, because it has been argued that “decay” of the
preceding task set during the intertrial interval might play
some role (Koch, 2001; Meiran et al., 2000). However, in
the context of the present research, we can exclude such
factors (e.g., the length of the intertrial interval) as possible
sources of the general RT slowing we observed inside the
scanner because we kept these factors strictly constant
across our three experimental groups. In fact, the novel
aspect of our study is that we investigated the effect of
testing condition under otherwise identical experimental
conditions, whereas neuroimaging studies typically estab-
lish in their experimental paradigm the behavioral effect
they are interested in but do not compare it to that found in
standard testing conditions. In our study, we matched these
conditions as closely as possible. Our results suggest that
the effect of testing condition is most likely functionally
located at “late” motor processes and that cognitive pro-
cesses are unaffected by the testing environment (i.e., inside
vs outside the scanner).
Still, despite our conclusion that, most likely, cognitive
processes inside and outside the scanner are functionally
equivalent, our finding of greatly elevated baseline RT in-
side the scanner has potentially important methodological
implications. Consider, for instance, experiments requiring
a response deadline. Researchers using such techniques
should keep in mind that strict response deadlines that are
established in behavioral pilot experiments are unlikely to
be appropriate during the scanning session because baseline
RT will be increased. As another example, consider exper-
iments on stimulus–response compatibility using Stroop-
like, Simon-like, or flanker interference tasks, in which
nominally irrelevant stimulus features interfere with perfor-
mance (for review, see, e.g., Kornblum et al., 1990; Lu and
Proctor, 1995). Here, the relevant cognitive process under-
lying the usually observed compatibility effect is assumed
to depend on a temporally decaying code (Hommel, 1994;
Kornblum et al., 1999). This code decay might progress to
a larger degree due to the longer RT in the scanner, so that
the general slowing inside the scanner relative to normal
behavioral testing conditions could affect the size of the
effect. However, our results suggest that the general slowing
inside the scanner presumably does not affect cognitive
processes such as response selection, which is commonly
held responsible for compatibility effects (cf. Lien and Proc-
tor, 2002, for review), but “late” motor processes subse-
quent to response selection, so that the cognitive process
under study is most likely unaffected. Still, we believe that
this issue represents an important topic for further investi-
gation. We think that drawing the attention of cognitive
neuroscience researchers using brain-imaging techniques to
this potentially relevant methodological issue is an impor-
tant contribution of the present study.
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